Seeing (Platforms) Like a State: Digital Legibility and Lessons for Platform Governance by Chilson, Neil
Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology 
Volume 29 
Issue 2 Spring 2021 Article 4 
2021 
Seeing (Platforms) Like a State: Digital Legibility and Lessons for 
Platform Governance 
Neil Chilson 
Charles Koch Institute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and 
Sports Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Internet Law 
Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, Law and Society Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the 
Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Neil Chilson, Seeing (Platforms) Like a State: Digital Legibility and Lessons for Platform Governance, 29 
Cath. U. J. L. & Tech 31 (2021). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt/vol29/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
 
31 
SEEING (PLATFORMS) LIKE A STATE: 
DIGITAL LEGIBILITY AND LESSONS FOR 
PLATFORM GOVERNANCE 
Neil Chilson∗ 
I.  Why Seeing Like a State? ..................................................................................................... 34 
II. What Is ‘Legibility’? ........................................................................................................ 37 
III. Information Technology Has Rapidly Increased The Speed at Which The 
World is Becoming More Legible .................................................................................... 41 
IV. Increased Legibility Has Triggered Concerns .................................................................... 45 
A.   People Fear They Are Losing Privacy ..................................................................... 46 
B.   People Fear They Are Being Taken Advantage Of .................................................. 48 
C.   People Fear Their Business Models Are Becoming Obsolete .................................. 48 
D.   People Fear Others Are Being Misinformed ............................................................ 49 
V. Lessons From Seeing Like A State ....................................................................................... 51 
A.  Minimize Simplistic Legibility .................................................................................... 52 
B.  Temper Ambitious Plans with Prudence and Humility ............................................... 53 
C.  Reduce the Planner’s Ability to Impose a Plan .......................................................... 54 
D.  Increase the Ability of the Participants to Resist or Shape Such Plans ..................... 55 
VI. Example Application: Privacy – Rules or Standards? ........................................................ 56 




The growing backlash against Big Tech companies is a symptom of digital 
technology increasing the legibility of the world. New tools of sensing and 
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computing have simplified the collection and analysis of information about 
humanity and the world around us and made it more understandable. This 
increased legibility is driving concerns about privacy, manipulation, 
obsolescence, and misinformation. 
How did governments adjust to past rapid increases in legibility? Yale 
anthropologist James C. Scott’s book, Seeing Like a State: How Certain 
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, explores this question 
in depth and provides insights for how governments and companies should 
respond today.1 
Scott argues that the success of the Industrial Revolution motivated a “high 
modernism” mindset in government, with state leaders seeking to 
fundamentally reshape and improve society.2 To pursue such ambitious tasks 
governments needed a society that was legible, often achieved by eliminating 
important complexities and ignoring local knowledge.3 Scott argues that when 
“schemes to improve the human condition” include characteristics of imposed 
legibility, a high-modernist mindset, strong central control, and weak social or 
political constraints, they are doomed to fail, sometimes in horrific ways.4 
To avoid such outcomes, Scott’s work suggests four lessons for anyone who 
would intervene in complex systems: (1) minimize simplistic legibility; (2) 
temper ambitious plans with prudence and humility; (3) reduce the planner’s 
ability to impose a plan; and (4) increase the ability of participants to resist or 
shape such plans.5 
As governments and tech platforms seek to address the concerns driving the 
“techlash,” these lessons provide guidance on how to avoid the worst pitfalls 




Big Tech platforms are facing a backlash of angry rhetoric and government 
action.7 Such companies handle enormous volumes of speech and 
                                                          
 1 JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE 
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 2 (Yale Univ. Press, 1998). 
 2 Id. at 4–5. 
 3 Id. at 6. 
 4 Id. at 4. 
 5 Id. at 4–5. 
 6 Robert D. Atkinson et al., A Policymaker’s Guide to ‘Techlash’—What It Is and Why 
It’s a Threat to Growth and Progress, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Oct. 28, 2019), 
https://itif.org/publications/2019/10/28/policymakers-guide-techlash. 
 7 Clara Hendrickson & William A. Galston, Big Tech Threats: Making Sense of the 
Backlash Against Online Platforms, BROOKINGS INST. (May 28, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/big-tech-threats-making-sense-of-the-backlash-against-
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communications for billions of people worldwide.8 The systems they design 
and the rules they set and enforce, therefore, have significant consequences for 
individuals and the public. Just five years ago, media and political sentiment 
for Big Tech was overwhelmingly positive and focused on the massive 
benefits, realized and potential, that these companies could offer.9 Today, that 
sentiment has changed: These companies stand accused of a wide range of 
problems, from invading privacy and causing addiction, to even enabling 
election manipulation.10 Regulators are investigating and suing these 
companies, while legislators are proposing new laws targeting Big Tech.11 This 
“techlash,” perhaps most prominent in the United States and Europe, exists 
around the world.12 
What concerns drive the “techlash” and what should platforms and 
governments do to address them? In this paper I argue that the “techlash” is a 
symptom of digital technology increasing the legibility of the world. New tools 
of sensing and computing have simplified the collection and analysis of 
information about us and the world around us. They have made the world more 
readable. 
Society previously experienced periods of rapid legibility increases. Today’s 
tools of digital legibility continue a long tradition of tools that increase the 
legibility of the world and thus our ability to understand and manipulate it. For 
example, tools like the microscope or x-ray machine were revolutionary 
because they accessed previously inaccessible information.13 Scientists used 
this new information to better understand the world. Doctors, inventors, and 
engineers used it to solve practical problems. This applied understanding of the 
world led to vast increases in progress and prosperity. 
How did governments react to past increases in legibility? Yale 
anthropologist James C. Scott’s book Seeing Like a State: How Certain 
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed explores this question 
                                                                                                                                      
online-platforms/. 
 8 The Myth of Social Media, GALLUP, https://online.wsj.com/public/resources/ 
documents/sac_report_11_socialmedia_061114.pdf (last visited May 5, 2021). 
 9 Bijan Stephen, How Black Lives Matters Uses Social Media to Fight the Power, 
WIRED (Nov. 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/how-black-lives-matter-uses-social-
media-to-fight-the-power/. 
 10 Casey Newton, New Legislation is Putting Social Networks in the Crosshairs, VERGE 
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/1/20749517/social-network-legislation-
hawley-privacy-research. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Atkinson, supra note 6. 
 13 Laura Poppick, Let Us Now Praise the Invention of the Microscope, SMITHSONIAN 
MAG. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-we-owe-to-
the-invention-microscope-180962725/; Disruptive Technology 1890s-style: the Impact of 
the X-ray, PHILIPS (Nov. 6, 2015), https://medium.com/@Philips/disruptive-technology-
1890s-style-the-impact-of-the-x-ray-3cc1c4e5ff0a. 
34 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 29.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
in depth and provides guidance for how governments and companies should 
respond today.14 Scott argues that the success of the Industrial Revolution— 
which was driven by legibility-increasing scientific discoveries—motivated a 
“high modernist” mindset.15 This mindset tasked governments with 
fundamentally reshaping and improving society.16 To pursue such ambitious 
tasks, governments needed society to be legible, and often imposed such 
legibility—usually by eliminating important complexities and ignoring local 
knowledge.17 
State-imposed legibility has unintended consequences.18 Scott argues that 
“schemes to improve the human condition” include characteristics of imposed 
legibility, a high-modernist mindset, strong central control, and weak social or 
political constraints, they are doomed to fail, sometimes in horrific ways.19 
To avoid such outcomes, his work suggests four lessons for those who 
would intervene in complex systems: (1) minimize simplistic legibility; (2) 
temper ambitious plans with prudence and humility; (3) reduce the planner’s 
ability to impose a plan; and (4) increase the ability of participants to resist or 
shape such plans.20 
In today’s world of increased and increasing legibility, governments and 
tech platforms should heed these lessons. As governments and tech platforms 
seek to address the concerns driving the techlash, these lessons provide 
guidance on how to avoid the worst side effects and failures that can befall 
schemes to improve the human condition online. 
I.  WHY SEEING LIKE A STATE? 
In order to navigate this topic efficiently, I must provide a quick summary of 
my roadmap: Yale Sterling Professor of Political Science James C. Scott’s 
groundbreaking work, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve 
the Human Condition Have Failed (“SLAS”).21 Published in 1998, SLAS 
describes how governments throughout history attempted to understand the 
people and lands they governed.22 It argues that the limits of this understanding 
combined with other elements doomed many ambitious and often well-
                                                          
 14 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 2. 
 15 Id. at 4. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 2. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 4–6. 
 20 Id. at 4–5. 
 21 See generally id. 
 22 Id. at 1–2, 6. 
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meaning government programs to catastrophic failure.23 
Scott identifies four characteristics common to the failed government efforts 
that he studied.24 First, government develops a simplified model of the 
complex system it wants to change, increasing its legibility but losing 
important knowledge.25 Second, the project leadership has a “high modernism” 
mindset that sets out ambitious plans for redesigning the system.26 Third, the 
leadership has sufficiently comprehensive authority to be able to mandate the 
adoption of these plans.27 And finally, the civil society involved is too weak to 
overtly resist the imposition of the plans.28 
Why is Scott’s analysis of failed government programs a good guide for 
understanding tech platform governance? I can think of at least three reasons. 
First and most directly, SLAS explores the limits of what governments can 
accomplish when regulating or even understanding complex systems.29 Online 
platforms and the internet more generally are highly complex systems.30 Thus, 
SLAS has insights for policy makers as they think about how to understand and 
regulate in this space. 
Second, SLAS has lessons for companies, too; many claim that the biggest 
consumer-facing platforms, with billions of users, are similar to 
governments.31 This comparison has significant limits—the most important 
being that these platforms lack a monopoly on legitimate force, meaning that 
actual governments can still impose rules on them.32 Still, platforms share the 
third characteristic that Scott discusses: platforms have a lot of authority over 
the systems they operate.33 They possess a high degree of control over the 
design of the applications and services they offer to users.34 Indeed, their 
technical ability to design the entirety of the user environment surpasses the 
                                                          
 23 Id. at 4. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 5. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 2 (“In each case, officials took exceptionally complex, illegible, and local social 
practices, such as land tenure customs or naming customs, and created a standard grid 
whereby it could be centrally recorded and monitored.”). 
 30 Kihong Park, The Internet as a Complex System, PURDUE UNIV. (2005), 
https://www.cs.purdue.edu/nsl/complex.pdf. 
 31 See Winston Hearn, Seeing Like a Tech Company, WINSTON THE THIRD (Aug. 12, 
2020), https://www.winstonhearn.com/wrote/2020/seeing-like-a-tech-company/. 
 32 Id.; see also Chris Hoofnagle, Symposium, Seeing Like A Platform, BCLT/BTLJ 
(Apr. 2019), https://hoofnagle.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/hoofnagle_bltj_ 
2019_seeing.pdf. 
 33 See Hearn, supra note 31 (noting that big tech platforms are like quasi-states in that 
they are “wielding immense power, not simply over individuals, but also over the shape of 
human culture at large.”). 
 34 Id. 
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ability of even totalitarian governments to modify the physical or social 
environment of their subjects.35 Practically speaking, and in part because of the 
lack of a monopoly of force, platforms face many constraints that authoritarian 
governments do not: investor influence, user feedback, local laws, market 
forces, etc.36 Still, platforms’ high levels of control over their users’ 
environments means that platforms could benefit from SLAS’s lessons about 
the challenges of executing ambitious plans over large populations.37 
The third reason SLAS applies to platforms is related to the second. SLAS is 
not just a critical review of ambitious government projects.38 At its core, SLAS 
is about how such ambitious projects are facilitated or frustrated by 
information, information collection, and limits to information collection.39 
SLAS focuses on government projects, but many tech companies’ projects rely 
heavily on information collection.40 SLAS’s lessons about the limits of 
information collection apply to these companies’ strategies.41 
It is true that the consequences of the failures in SLAS are of a different 
scale. Scott describes some of the most tragic humanitarian disasters of the last 
century, caused by grand government projects,42 whereas I am talking about 
potential failures by creators of websites and mobile apps. Still, even if the 
stakes are lower than preventing humanitarian disasters, they can still be high. 
Mistakes in Facebook’s newsfeed decisions are unlikely to cause suffering on 
the level of, say, Soviet forced relocation. But they are important to civil 
discourse, news reporting, and our democracy.43 So, I believe the lessons of 
                                                          
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Issie Lapowsky, How Facebook’s Oversight Board Could Rewrite the Rules of the 
Entire Internet, PROTOCOL (May 6, 2020), https://www.protocol.com/facebook-oversight-
board-rules-of-the-internet. 
 38 Hearn, supra note 31 (noting that Scott’s book “is interested in these processes that 
happen from the top down, states defining their goals and using power to force upon the 
populace changes that are intended ‘for their benefit’ but ultimately fail and lead to great 
human suffering. . . . I couldn’t help but see terrifying parallels to the modern tech 
industry.”). 
 39 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 2 (“I began to see legibility as a central problem in 
statecraft.”). 
 40 See Aliza Vigderman & Gabe Turner, The Data Big Tech Companies Have on You, 
SECURITY.ORG (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.security.org/resources/data-tech-companies-
have/ (remarking on how much data companies have at their disposal from their services). 
 41 See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know 
as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/ 
technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html (explaining how Facebook used 
collected information that was provided to Cambridge Analytica and subsequently used to 
potentially influence voters in the United States election of 2016). 
 42 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 3. 
 43 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing 
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SLAS remain relevant. 
The remainder of the article will proceed as follows: first, the remainder of 
this introduction describes what I (building on Scott) mean by legibility. 
Section II explains how information technology is making the world more 
legible. Section III lists and discusses four concerns motivated by this 
increased legibility. Section IV distills from SLAS’s four lessons for 
governance in this new environment. And Section V walks through an example 
of applying those lessons to a technology policy question. Finally, Section VI 
concludes. 
II. WHAT IS ‘LEGIBILITY’? 
Because I will be using the term so much, it is worth digging into what I 
mean by the word “legible.”44 Like Scott, I mean approximately the dictionary 
definition of legible: “capable of being read,” where “read” is interpreted very 
broadly to mean “able to gather information from.”45 For example, a 
thermometer outside my kitchen window would make the outdoor temperature 
legible to me. As the title of Scott’s book suggests, he focuses on what is 
legible to the state.46 I will apply the same term but more broadly consistent 
with and even implied by Scott’s work. 
A few relevant characteristics of legibility as Scott uses the term: 
Legibility is subjective. Something that is perfectly legible to one can be 
illegible to another.47 For example, a village’s unique weights and measures, 
used successfully every day by local farmers and merchants, might be useless 
to central government administrators, unless they can convert it into familiar 
units.48 Language may be the prototypical example of a complex system that 
can be perfectly legible to one person while incomprehensible to another.49 In 
the digital world, encryption can limit legibility to certain parties. But even 
unencrypted information, such as session tracking cookies, might be available 
to many parties but understandable to only a few.50 
Legibility can be imposed. Building on this idea of subjectivity, Scott 
provides many examples of central authorities’ efforts to clarify, for their 
                                                                                                                                      
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (2018). 
 44 See generally SCOTT, supra note 1, at 2. 
 45 Legible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (Feb. 11, 2021), 
http://www.merriam-webster.com. 
 46 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 2. 
 47 Id. at 24. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 72–73. 
 50 The Internet and Data Privacy: What Is Collected, How to Opt-Out of Cookies and 
Disable Data Collection, SECURITY.ORG (July 16, 2020), https://www.security.org/digital-
safety/data-privacy/. 
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purposes, matters that locals do not need clarified.51 Such examples include 
standardized weights and measures, mandatory surnames, property surveys and 
population registers, scientific agriculture, and design of cities.52 The internet 
is protocol layer upon protocol layer of imposed legibility, although here the 
better descriptor might be designed legibility; there was no pre-existing local 
ordering replaced by, say, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol.53 
Imposed legibility has a purpose. When a state imposes legibility, it does 
so in pursuit of a specific objective: easing tax collection; maximizing crops; 
or streamlining military transportation.54 Often states impose legibility to 
assemble a summarized, synoptic view to guide interventions.55 Scott describes 
such efforts to make things “more legible—and hence manipulable—from 
above and from the center.”56 
Legibility simplifies. Even though legibility can be imposed, when it is 
imposed for a purpose it necessarily is a simplification that fails to fully 
capture the local knowledge it summarizes.57 Scott describes tools of legibility 
as “rather like abridged maps [that] did not successfully represent the activity 
of the society they depicted, nor were they intended to; they represented only 
that slice of it that interested the official observer.”58 Scott uses the term mētis 
to describe one type of information discarded when states impose legibility on 
a complex system.59 This Greek word denotes knowledge that can only be 
obtained from practical experience.60 Simple examples include riding a bike or 
sailing a boat. More complex examples include the “soft skills” of international 
diplomacy or leading a company.61 This type of knowledge is very specific to 
an activity. Often, it is not even fully legible to the practitioner—they can’t 
explain to another person precisely how to do what they have done.62 Because 
mētis is not fully legible even to those who possess it, it cannot be captured 
when states seek to make a complex system legible.63 And often, those 
imposing legibility make the mistake of regarding mētis as useless noise or 
                                                          
 51 See SCOTT, supra note 1, at 2. 
 52 See id. at 2. 
 53 Park, supra note 30, at 1. 
 54 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 5. 
 55 Id. at 352. 
 56 Id. at 2. 
 57 Id. at 11. 
 58 Id. at 3. 
 59 Id. at 6. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 22. 
 62 Id. at 3. 
 63 Id. 
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disorder when it actually represents complexity.64 
Legibility and ambition feed each other. As Scott describes, instruments 
of imposed legibility such as censuses, surveys, and population registers have 
long been the basic tools of statecraft.65 As the state gathers information, even 
simplified information, it can more precisely and effectively deliver services 
and pursue its mandates.66 But as its mandates and purposes grow so too does 
its need for information and thus its need for increased legibility.67 In some 
cases, when a state imposes legibility, it may disrupt a local community and 
therefore increase the need for the centralized authority to intervene.68 
Scott focuses on state-imposed legibility, but there are other methods for 
increasing legibility. Consider the microscope. Its invention opened a new 
territory for exploration—it made legible a tiny, previously invisible domain.69 
Other legibility-increasing tools include the sundial, the metronome, the clock, 
the compass, the scale, the barometer, the stethoscope, and the x-ray—and 
more recently, the video camera and the microphone.70 “Discovered” legibility 
differs from imposed legibility because it does not change the observed system 
(except, perhaps for observations at the quantum level).71 
This type of discovered legibility has been a major driver of scientific and 
technical progress.72 Once new tools of increased legibility make information 
legible, people can apply logic and scientific methods to this newly legible 
information to generate new hypothesis and theories and to solve practical 
problems.73 
Scott does not expressly talk about this “discovered” legibility, but his work 
documents how the increases in scientific legibility during the Industrial Age 
                                                          
 64 Id. at 356–57. 
 65 Id. at 70–71. 
 66 Id. at 29. 
 67 Id. at 6. 
 68 Id. at 73. 
 69 See Liz Logan, Early Microscopes Revealed a New World of Tiny Living Things, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-
nature/early-microscopes-revealed-new-world-tiny-living-things-180958912/; see also 
Antonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), BBC (2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ 
historic_figures/van_leeuwenhoek_antonie.shtml (highlighting the life of the seventeenth-
century Dutch citizen who popularized the microscope despite having no formal scientific 
education through descriptions of bacteria that he observed after making his own lenses to 
examine fabrics in his drapery shop. The British Royal Society initially doubted his 
discovery as previous lenses and microscopes could not view organisms as small as 
bacteria). 
 70 See Measurement, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Feb. 4 2020), https://www. 
britannica.com/technology/measurement. 
 71 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 24. 
 72 Id. at 4. 
 73 Id. at 11. 
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heavily influenced governments and governance.74 Specifically, Scott argues 
that the wild success of the Industrial Age inspired intellectuals in the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth century to favor dramatically expanding the role 
of the government.75 
In the mid-nineteenth century, intellectuals began aspiring to 
administratively reorder nature and society.76 Scott calls this mindset “high 
modernism.”77 “Modernism” refers to adherents’ wishes to emulate the success 
of the ongoing Industrial Revolution.78 To them, the Industrial Revolution 
demonstrated the near limitless potential of scientific and technical expertise to 
solve practical problems—including, they thought, all kinds of social 
problems.79 “High” refers to the lofty ambition of these intellectuals.80 For 
most of human history, the state’s goals were modest: extract taxes, repel 
invaders, quell rebellion.81 The concept that the state should seek to improve 
the well-being of society was a novel one.82 High-modernist plans were not 
incremental or subtle; they disdained history and often they sought to wipe out 
previous approaches and replace them with wholly re-engineered solutions.83 
High-modernist governments sought “the rational design of social order 
commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws.”84 Science 
solved practical problems using information discovered through tools like the 
microscope; high-modernist governments sought to solve governance problems 
using information gathered through state tools of imposed legibility.85 
But Scott is careful to distinguish high modernism from scientific practice, 
noting: 
It was fundamentally, as the term ‘ideology’ implies, a faith that 
borrowed, as it were, the legitimacy of science and technology. It 
was, accordingly, uncritical, unskeptical, and thus unscientifically 
optimistic about the possibilities for the comprehensive planning of 
human settlement and production.86 
This enthusiasm for a broad scope of government and confidence in the 
                                                          
 74 Id. at 354. 
 75 Id. at 4–5. 
 76 Id. at 4. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 4–5. 
 81 Id. at 2. 
 82 Id. at 2–3. 
 83 Id. at 5. 
 84 Id. at 4. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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ability of experts to shape society was common to individuals and groups that 
otherwise disagreed entirely on what society should look like.87 It found its 
most abhorrent and tragic expressions in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, 
but also undergirded more successful efforts such as Woodrow Wilson’s 
expansion of federal administrative agencies in the US.88 
III. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY HAS RAPIDLY INCREASED THE 
SPEED AT WHICH THE WORLD IS BECOMING MORE LEGIBLE 
Like the Industrial Age, we are in a new era of rapidly increasing legibility. 
This is due primarily to information technology, which has increased the 
legibility of the world in four ways.89 Understanding these four ways matters 
to governing technology, because each type of increased legibility raises 
different policy concerns.90 
First, we conduct more of our interactions in the highly legible online 
environment.91 Cyberspace is perhaps the most comprehensive and heavily 
used example of imposed legibility in human history.92 The entire environment 
was designed. It is an information environment where legibility is the point 
(legibility to whom is an important question, however.).93 Though the internet 
has evolved over time, the core protocols remain highly legible.94 The basic 
protocols underlying the internet were built to relay information across servers 
that are owned and used by many different organizations and people.95 This 
requires information to be observed—and not just by the party to whom it is 
addressed. 
How does online legibility compare to the offline world? The online world 
is complex, but it remains much simpler than the offline world and thus 
contains less total information. But unlike the offline world, nearly all 
information online can be observed, collected, and analyzed relatively easily.96 
                                                          
 87 See id. 
 88 See id. at 5. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See id. at 4. 
 91 Paresh Dave, Zuckerberg Says Facebook’s Future is Going Big on Private Chats, 
REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-zuckerberg/ 
zuckerberg-says-facebooks-future-is-going-big-on-private-chats-idUSKCN1QN2JR. 
 92 See Manuel Castells, The Impact of the Internet on Society: A Global Perspective, 
MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/2014/09/08/171458/ 
the-impact-of-the-internet-on-society-a-global-perspective/. 
 93 See id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See Park, supra note 30, at 2 (describing the Internet as a complex system unique in 
the fact that it is a “melting pot” and a “man-made many-body system.”). 
 96 See John Brownlee, Here’s What Websites Know About You, Just From the Way You 
Browse, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3065894/heres-
42 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 29.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
When you browse an online store, the computers hosting that website know in 
detail how you interacted with the website.97 Logging and analyzing those 
interactions is a straightforward process.98 Compare that to the local grocery 
store, where such data could theoretically be gathered but is unavailable 
without substantial additional effort. For these reasons, the online world has 
achieved a level of legibility that surpasses any previous environment where 
humans regularly interact.99 As people do more of their daily transactions, 
work, and entertainment in an online environment, the percentage of their daily 
lives that becomes legible increases.100 
Although they may not use the word “legible,” countless others have 
observed that more information is collectable in the online world than 
offline.101 Often this is framed as a problem to be fixed. But the internet, like 
the microscope and other tools before it, offers access to more information. 
Whether this additional information is a “problem” depends on how it is used. 
The second way that technology increases legibility is through new sensor 
technologies.102 Technologies such as camera phones and internet connected 
appliances are digitizing ever greater portions of the physical world, increasing 
the legibility of our lives.103 In 2017, Cisco estimated that people used nearly 
five billion internet-connected devices to create links to machines in their cars, 
workplaces, and homes.104 Current projections estimate that the number will 
grow as high as 30.9 billion internet-connected devices by 2025.105 Federal, 
state, and local governments are incorporating internet-connected devices to 
conduct surveillance, monitor pollution levels, and guide the flow of traffic.106 
Internet-connected cameras have become particularly popular information-
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gathering tools for individuals, businesses, and governments.107 These 
increases in sensor deployment are making more of the previously offline 
world digitally legible.108 
Third, legibility increases as communications technology enables near-
instantaneous sharing of information with people far beyond the reach of 
physical communications.109 Even if the total amount of legible data in the 
world remained static, modern communications tools expand the number of 
people to whom certain types of information are legible.110 Such information 
includes breaking international news, the publicly shared opinions of many 
other persons, and personal communications in almost real-time.111 We can 
access in near-real time information about occurrences half the globe away.112 
Communications have greatly increased the amount of potential information 
available to any connected individual.113 
Finally, increased computational power has helped turn raw signals into 
useful information.114 An increase in raw observable signals is not an increase 
in legibility.115 It depends on whether that data is useful for a particular 
purpose. Turning signals into legible—and therefore useful—information 
requires analysis.116 Prior to the computer age, humans were the primary 
repositories of analytical power. Now, we have silicon machines that can 
perform sophisticated data analysis faster than humans can do addition, with 
the power of these devices continuously increasing.117 From 1956 to 2015, 
computing power grew one-trillion-fold.118 This computational power makes it 
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possible to glean insights from large data sets.119 
Data analytic tools can help increase legibility like a microscope, by 
identifying entirely new knowledge.120 Big data analytics can make legible 
unexpected connections within large data sets, extracting information 
embedded in a system that no one could explicitly identify.121 For example, the 
FDA used a database of thousands of Kaiser Permanente patient profiles to 
identify a heightened risk of heart attack in patients using Vioxx, an arthritis 
drug.122 Indeed, it appears that some of these analytical tools can make legible 
certain types of mētis, Scott’s term for embedded knowledge that usually 
cannot be made legible.123 
In other cases, algorithmic techniques appear capable of capturing mētis 
even if it cannot make that knowledge legible.124 Computer scientists have 
crafted algorithms that learn tasks by doing: riding a bike, playing Go, etc.125 
One could describe certain types of deep learning as learning mētis – 
knowledge that cannot be specified in rule sets but can only be learned through 
repeated exposure to varying but similar situations.126 Indeed, the familiar 
tradeoff between the explainability and the accuracy of certain deep learning 
algorithms is a tangible example of what might be lost when mētis is 
discarded.127 
But while these analytic tools are powerful, one should not overstate their 
capabilities. Data analysis and machine learning are not flawless or simple 
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processes.128 Such insights are not perfect, and sometimes not even useful. 
Even the most powerful deep learning tools today operate more like animal 
senses than like human cognition.129 And there are many well-known 
challenges, such as overfitting, underfitting, and unrepresentative source 
data.130 Sometimes, more data can increase the difficulty of generating 
information or knowledge.131 It can become difficult to separate signal from 
noise. Data can be mistaken or unrepresentative. Humans also remain subject 
to the same cognitive biases which large data sets can exacerbate.132 For 
example, we often identify coincidences as meaningful, and big data sets make 
it easier to detect correlations that turn out to be coincidental. Despite these 
challenges, computational tools can help generate knowledge and 
understanding from gathered data, making good use out of the world’s 
increased legibility.133 
These four trends mean that we have greater access to information about the 
state of the world. We have access to that information without regard to 
distance, and we can access it in a manner that is understandable and usable to 
a wider number of people. 
IV. INCREASED LEGIBILITY HAS TRIGGERED CONCERNS 
This rapid increase in the legibility of the world has generated new 
consumer and business fears.134 
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A.   People Fear They Are Losing Privacy 
IT tools increase the legibility of the world, much like the microscope.135 
But to a greater proportion than the microscope, some of today’s tools of 
increased legibility are used to study individuals, which concerns many 
people.136 
Online interactions are by design and necessity highly legible, both 
intentionally and out of necessity.137 As noted above, more of people’s day-to-
day activities occur online and therefore the legibility of those activities 
increases—just compare the capturable data involved when shopping on 
Amazon.com to shopping in your local CVS. Browsing the internet involves 
interactions with other people’s online computers. These interactions are 
generally viewable by the owners of those computers and others, even if the 
consumer browses while sitting at home. For example, online advertising 
technology makes the path one takes across the internet more legible in order 
to deliver better targeted ads.138 
Furthermore, the rise of sophisticated sensors and computational techniques 
means that our real-world interactions are also growing more legible.139 Smart 
sensors can detect when we arrive home or enter a retail store.140 Facial 
recognition technology potentially removes the relative anonymity of walking 
down a busy city block or drinking in a busy bar.141 We shout out questions to 
home assistants, which use that information to improve the responses they give 
us.142 
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As a result of the increased legibility of our activities, some people are 
concerned that they are losing privacy.143 The term “privacy” is notoriously 
flexible, but such concerns are generally rooted in a perceived or actual loss of 
the ability to control others’ use of data about oneself.144 As the amount of 
legible information about individuals grows and becomes accessible to other 
people, the more behavior becomes effectively public rather than effectively 
private.145 
In the past, people were concerned about the privacy impacts of then-new 
technologies that increased the legibility of human activity.146  Sometimes this 
concern generated new laws.147  For example, the introduction of popular 
portable cameras in the late 1800s made it possible to capture permanent 
information about individuals in public places.148 This new technology 
prompted calls for new legal privacy protections in the United States.149 In the 
60s and 70s, concerns about new credit reporting services that used data about 
individuals motivated Congress to pass federal legislation governing the use of 
such information.150 In other cases, society adapted without new legal 
approaches.151 For example, telephone caller ID features developed in the late 
80s were initially criticized as privacy violations, but nowadays most people 
consider the technology to actually protect privacy.152 
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B.   People Fear They Are Being Taken Advantage Of 
Another concern often expressed about the increased legibility of the world 
is that companies, or other people, will use information about someone else to 
gain leverage over them.153 This fear is prompted by the uneven distribution of 
increased legibility—people worry that someone has compiled information 
about them, but they do not know what information they possess, or how the 
other party might use it.154 For example, some people worry that companies 
will learn the price tolerance of various individuals and will charge higher 
prices for the same product to those who are willing to pay more.155 People 
also worry that companies will gather additional information and use it to 
commercially manipulate others through advertising or other messages.156 
Often, this latter fear is not personalized: People frequently believe they will 
not be fooled by such techniques but remain concerned that others will be.157 
C.   People Fear Their Business Models Are Becoming Obsolete 
Some people also worry that increased legibility of the world is making 
certain business models obsolete.158 Indeed, the growing legibility of the world 
has the potential to disrupt many current lines of business.159 It has already 
significantly transformed the advertising industry and, with it, the business 
models for content producers.160 For example, witnesses to newsworthy events 
can now share directly with interested audiences without news producers or 
reporters. Real-time traffic applications reduce the need for helicopter news 
                                                          
 153 New Poll Reveals 7 in 10 People Want Governments to Regulate Big Tech over 
Personal Data Fears, AMNESTY INT’L (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/ 
en/latest/news/2019/12/big-tech-privacy-poll-shows-people-worried/. 
 154 Auxier et al., supra note 136. 
 155 Phillip Longman, Big Tech is Watching Your Wallet, WASH. MONTHLY (April 2019), 
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/april-may-june-2019/big-tech-is-spying-on-your-
wallet/. 
 156 E.g., Arunesh Mathur et al., Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K 
Shopping Websites, 3 ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER-SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK & 
SOCIAL COMPUTING 81, 85 (2019). 
 157 Michael Barthel et al., Many Americans Believe Fake News Is Sowing Confusion, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/many-americans-
believe-fake-news-is-sowing-confusion/. 
 158 Gordon Hui, How the Internet of Things Changes Business Models, HARVARD BUS. 
REV. (July 29, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/how-the-internet-of-things-changes-business-
models. 
 159 Id. 
 160 The Media Industry: In the Vanguard of Digital Transformation, WORLD ECON. F., 
http://reports.weforum.org/digital-transformation/the-media-industry-in-the-vanguard-of-
digital-transformation/ (last visited May 5, 2021). 
2021] Seeing (Platforms) Like A State 49 
radio reports.161 Retail security systems that track unpurchased merchandise 
leaving the store reduce the need for security guards.162 
Being disrupted by a new technology is a common and reasonable concern, 
from the point of view of the incumbent business owner. Technology-driven 
productivity gains often threaten established business models. Incumbents with 
deep investments into the status quo will understandably be reluctant to give 
up their position, even if there are clear overall benefits to society.163 
D.   People Fear Others Are Being Misinformed 
The above-described concerns are fears about the increased legibility of the 
world—the ability to more accurately assess the state of the world.164 
However, some fear that people are misusing communications to propagate 
less accurate or downright deceptive information.165 The increase of this fear 
is, in part at least, due to increased legibility.166 
The same modern ability of an individual to speak to millions of others can 
be used to spread both false and true information.167 The declining power of 
gatekeeper entities who used to vet stories before mass distribution means that 
false stories can draw attention or website traffic and quickly propagate.168 
There is evidence that well-resourced entities with malicious intentions have 
used internet platforms to spread propaganda.169 And more traditional media 
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have amplified such efforts.170 
As a result, there is almost certainly more misinformation available to 
individuals than there was twenty or forty years ago.171 However, the store of 
available truthful information available has also increased significantly.172 
Thus, it is not clear whether the ratio of good to bad information has changed 
over that time; it is certainly easier than ever to research the correct answer 
than at any time in the past.173 
If it is easier than ever to find correct information, why is the fear of 
misinformation growing? One reason is a direct result of increased 
legibility.174 Misinformation created or spread by others is now more visible 
than ever.175 People have always spread rumors, misinformation, and 
falsehoods, but never have such statements been as permanently available to a 
worldwide audience. Rantings of a street corner flat-earth conspiracy theorist 
reach a small audience and disappear, forgotten. Online, however, such 
rantings become semi-permanent evidence of misinformation, so the increase 
in legibility of misinformation might suggest it is increasing.176 Furthermore, 
when faced with evidence that a large group of people believe something 
preposterous or distasteful, it can be difficult to accept that those people have 
independently reached a different conclusion. It may be easier to believe that 
such people are less autonomous than us and are being manipulated.177 
                                                                                                                                      
set of actors as “prime suspects in causing the present state of information disorder,” and 
later noting, “we are operating in a propaganda-rich environment and . . . network 
propaganda is a much deeper threat to democracy than any out-of-human-control socio-
technical process.”). 
 170 See generally id. 
 171 See id. at 37–38 (noting the widespread presence of misinformation in modern media, 
but also noting that its effect is likely less influential than outright propaganda). 
 172 See id. at 386. 
 173 See id. at 386 (“[these] observations suggest that professional journalism continues to 
play a critical role in anchoring public debate in facts and evidence-based norms and that it 
functions within a vibrant network of nontraditional sites that constitute a more 
decentralized, participatory networked public sphere that can work around and through its 
interactions with the mainstream to diversify expression, counter some of the failure modes 
of the mainstream, and make mobilization more democratic.”). 
 174 See Filippo Menczer & Thomas Hills, Information Overload Helps Fake News 
Spread and Social Media Knows It, SCI. AM., DIV. OF SPRINGER NATURE AM., INC. (Dec. 1, 
2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/information-overload-helps-fake-news-
spread-and-social-media-knows-it/. 
 175 See id. 
 176 See Brown, supra note 167. 
 177 See Menczer & Hills, supra note 174. 
2021] Seeing (Platforms) Like A State 51 
V. LESSONS FROM SEEING LIKE A STATE 
In seeking to take advantage of the opportunities raised by increased 
legibility, while addressing the related concerns, companies and policymakers 
can learn from Scott’s description of the effects of discovered and imposed 
legibility generated during the Industrial Age.178 
SLAS distills four characteristics common to failed government efforts to 
change complex systems.179 First, government uses simplifying tools to 
increase the legibility of the system to a central authority.180 Second, 
government embraces a high-modernism mindset with ambitious, overly 
confident, and comprehensive plans for redesigning the system.181 Third, 
government possesses enough authority and power to mandate adoption of 
these plans.182 Finally, civil society is too weak to overtly resist the imposition 
of the plans.183 
Scott describes the results of interventions that share these four 
characteristics: 
At best, the new order was fragile and vulnerable, sustained by 
improvisations not foreseen by its originators. At worst, it wreaked 
untold damage in shattered lives, damaged ecosystems, and 
fractured or impoverished societies.184 
To avoid these consequences, Scott argues for “institutions that are instead 
multifunctional, plastic, diverse, and adaptable—in other words, institutions 
that are powerfully shaped by mētis.”185 His four characteristics of failed 
interventions suggest four corresponding lessons for developing “mētis -
friendly institutions,” as he calls them: 
1. Minimize simplistic legibility 
2. Temper ambitious plans with prudence and humility 
3. Reduce the planner’s ability to impose a plan 
4. Increase the ability of participants to resist or shape such 
plans.186 
I will elaborate on each of these strategies. I have tried to keep the 
discussion generic enough to apply to company decisions as well as the 
government decisions addressed by Scott. Each lesson can be applied 
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separately or in combination. Although Scott mostly discusses government 
institutions, he argues for the importance of incorporating mētis in any 
institution where “the quality of the institution and its product depends on 
engaging the enthusiastic participation of its people.”187 That description 
certainly applies to online platforms, as do these lessons.188 
A.  Minimize Simplistic Legibility 
As discussed earlier, when a state seeks to understand a complex system in 
order to control it, the state increases legibility of that system by reducing 
complexity.189 It does so by replacing or discarding knowledge not relevant to 
its purpose.190 Imposing legibility in pursuit of one purpose can change the 
system, undermining other purposes the system may have also served.191 The 
old business adage that “you get what you measure” applies here. Such 
simplistic, reductive legibility efforts abandon information and can damage the 
system.192 
There are two ways to minimize simplistic legibility. The most 
straightforward would be to avoid imposing legibility in the first place.193 But 
businesses and government need information for certain purposes. They need 
insight into the system they seek to govern. Without such information, their 
efforts will have less effect in achieving their goal and possibly do more harm 
to the governed system.194 
Still, in some circumstances, the benefits of limiting legibility could 
outweigh the costs. In the physical world, where imposed legibility replaces a 
local tradition or knowledge, withdrawing imposed legibility could enable 
people to re-establish their local knowledge and mētis.195 One might 
reasonably decide that the benefits from this would be worth forgoing or 
limiting a specific purpose. For example, a central government might decline 
to adopt a single official language despite the decrease in legibility. 
But in the digital context, the network protocols—the physics of cyberspace 
—must be chosen by someone. In this designed environment, defaulting to the 
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highest possible level of legibility makes sense. After all, building fundamental 
limits to information in the foundation of a general-purpose system would be 
like changing the physics of light in order to prevent peeping toms. It would 
permanently foreclose some types of inquiry without knowing what tradeoffs 
that might impose. Instead, it is better to make the lowest level of the system as 
legible as possible, and then build protocols on top of it to protect information. 
Don’t change the physics of light—instead, install a privacy fence. 
The second way to limit simplistic legibility is to avoid oversimplifying as 
much as possible.196 This is difficult. In all cases, imposing legibility affects 
information that could be useful for other purposes. In the worst cases, 
including many of those documented by Scott, the imposed legibility destroys 
information necessary to carry out the state’s intended purpose.197 
But while it is not possible to completely avoid simplification, different 
methods of imposing legibility differ in how and what they simplify.198 Being 
conscious of the collateral effects of the methods can help the authority choose 
the least reductive model.199 New data analysis tools may help because they 
can be used on complex, non-heterogenous data. Rather than squeeze needed 
information into a governance-friendly format, analytical tools may make it 
possible to collect the information in the more complex form yet still derive 
useful knowledge from it.200 
B.  Temper Ambitious Plans with Prudence and Humility 
The second lesson is to avoid the high-modernist mindset.201 This does not 
necessarily mean abandoning lofty goals, but it does mean pursuing them with 
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a plan that reflects some degree of humility, respect for the existing knowledge 
in the system, and a realistic assessment of what might go wrong.202 Scott 
recommends two concrete methods to avoid high modernism.203 First, he 
suggests planners take incremental steps toward their goal and allow plenty of 
opportunities to receive feedback and adjust.204 Second, he encourages 
approaches that can be reversed without too much disturbance if things go 
badly.205 Both recommendations help accommodate inevitable surprises and 
unanticipated reactions and adjustments by participants.206 
For example, in dealing with misinformation, rather than adopting a 
comprehensive initial plan that attempts to cover all categories of potential 
misinformation, platforms could identify one narrow category of 
misinformation to focus on. They could test several different techniques on 
identifying this type of content and how to deal with it (by removal or 
flagging?). This would allow them to learn from user feedback and any 
adaptations by generators of such misinformation, and then apply those lessons 
to broader categories of misinformation. 
C.  Reduce the Planner’s Ability to Impose a Plan 
Another lesson is to limit the ability of the planner to impose a plan.207 If the 
planner cannot force adoption of a plan, it will need to persuade people—a 
process that requires compromise and emergent decision making, and therefore 
incorporates a far wider range of input and knowledge.208 
The US government has existing limits on its ability to impose central plans: 
constitutional rights for individuals, separation of powers, and federalism, to 
name a few.209 Some of these limits have eroded over time, but they remain 
fundamentally sound. Other nations have far fewer or no such limits.210 While 
it may be desirable to strengthen such limits, this is not a practical approach for 
our purposes and in any case is outside of the scope of this paper. 
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But how might a large platform apply this lesson? Platforms do face 
constraints on their authority, as mentioned earlier; for example, market 
pressures, local law, and investor interests.211 One way to further limit a 
platform’s ability to impose a central plan would be to strengthen any of these 
constraints. For example, local laws could be changed to limit platforms’ 
abilities. Of course, such laws themselves have all the weaknesses of 
centralized decision-making and should be evaluated accordingly. 
Still, platforms could themselves take additional measures to limit their 
ability to impose certain plans. For example, platforms could push decision 
making out to independent organizations or standards bodies.212 They could 
make legally binding promises about how they will use or change the platform. 
Yet another approach is to make certain types of control technically infeasible. 
For example, Mark Zuckerberg has recently announced that Facebook is 
shifting toward an encrypted private chatroom business model.213 Such a self-
imposed reduction of legibility would limit Facebook’s ability to review or 
moderate certain content. 
D.  Increase the Ability of the Participants to Resist or Shape Such Plans 
Finally, governments and companies could improve the ability of 
individuals and the system to resist and/or to shape plans. Scott specifically 
encourages the establishment of mētis-friendly systems that enhance users and 
incorporate their values.214 He argues that one can test for mētis-friendly 
systems by asking “to what degree does it promise to enhance the skills, 
knowledge, and responsibility of those who are a part of it?” and “how deeply 
[the institution] is marked by the values and experience of those who compose 
it.”215 
Usefully incorporating user input for large populations usually requires 
decentralized approaches where a company (or government) does not control 
content.216 The paradigmatic example of such a system is the complex market 
forces that channel consumer demands into producer incentives.217 Such 
solutions can scale readily with the addition of more users.218 They can apply a 
                                                          
 211 Devin Coldewey, Who Regulates Social Media?, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 19, 2020), 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/19/who-regulates-social-media/. 
 212 Issie Lapowsky, How Facebook’s Oversight Board Could Rewrite the Rules of the 
Entire Internet, PROTOCOL (May 6, 2020), https://www.protocol.com/facebook-oversight-
board-rules-of-the-internet. 
 213 Dave, supra note 91. 
 214 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 353. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
56 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 29.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
user’s knowledge and values directly to the problem they are facing.219 
Additionally, they are flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances or 
user needs.220 
To embrace this lesson, platforms could create tools that empower various 
users or groups of users to help govern themselves and their communities. 
Such tools could include consumer review and ratings systems, deputizing 
users, creating more broadly accessible moderator tools, and incentivizing 
beneficial user behavior. Platforms like Wikipedia and Reddit already use such 
tools and benefit from the social norms that have developed around them.221 
These tools enable the platform to incorporate user knowledge and mētis and 
evolve as users change.222 
VI. EXAMPLE APPLICATION: PRIVACY – RULES OR STANDARDS? 
Many policy problems—including the four legibility-generated fears 
discussed earlier—could benefit from applying the SLAS lessons. While I 
provide a few examples of how the four lessons might be employed by 
platforms and regulators, it is worth digging into another example to consider 
how those strategies might be applied. 
As discussed earlier, much of the concern around privacy comes from 
individuals misperceiving how legible their behaviors are. People, institutions, 
and companies are still adapting to increased legibility.223 As society adapts, 
there are a wide number of tools available. These include shifting social norms, 
technological changes, private agreements, soft law, enforcement of common 
law or general consumer protection laws, and new legislation.224 The SLAS 
lessons discussed above provide one way to evaluate and compare the forms of 
these tools in general, or to compare specific proposals of how to use these 
tools. 
In order to demonstrate the SLAS criteria, however, I will limit myself to 
comparing the two different federal privacy approaches in the US: the rule-
based regulatory approach225 and the case-by-case enforcement of general 
standards approach.226 Contrary to common perception, the US does have 
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federal privacy protections, and they take these two forms. The US regulates 
the practices of specific industries, such as financial, credit, and health.227 In 
these sectors companies must follow detailed ex ante rules established by 
Congress and/or regulators—the rules-based approach.228  For other sectors, 
the Federal Trade Commission brings ex post enforcement actions under its 
consumer protection authority when it believes companies’ uses of consumer 
data have been unfair or deceptive—the standards approach.229 
Outside of the privacy context, lawyers, economists, and philosophers have 
long debated rules versus standards.230 There are many benefits and detriments 
to each. This example is not intended to rehash that entire, useful debate. My 
purpose is to evaluate these two approaches to privacy considering the lessons 
from SLAS. 
Case-by-case enforcement of standards minimizes simplistic legibility. 
Even ignoring the content of the rules and standards being compared, rules 
by their nature impose more legibility than do standards. Rulemaking is 
characterized in part by imposing legibility on the governed practices and 
entities.231 For example, privacy statutes, whether sector specific like the 
Health Information Privacy Protection Act or economy-wide like Europe’s 
General Data Protection Regulation, define many characteristics of information 
and business practices.232 Is data sensitive or non-sensitive? Personally 
identifiable or anonymized? Health data? What is a data processor as compared 
to a data controller? Stakeholders fiercely debate such regulatory definitions 
because those definitions create simplified, legally significant categories that 
will apply to future types of information.233 Creating definitions that apply in 
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multiple situations requires distilling what is common to such scenarios and 
discarding the unique context of each situation. The broader the applicability 
of the definition, the more total context must be discarded to form a workable 
definition. That is why, for example, it is easier to define “sensitive” or 
personal information in a sector-specific privacy law (like financial services) 
than it is to define that same term for all sectors. 
Compare the legibility imposed in rulemaking with ex post enforcement of 
privacy under general principles like “unfairness” and “deception.”234 Those 
terms are not defined ahead of time. Instead, those concepts are developed over 
time through application of judgment to different sets of facts. Regarding 
privacy, those concepts are further fleshed out by Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) “soft law” in guidance and reports.235 Many of the same terms defined 
in privacy legislation are described in such guidance. For example, the FTC 
discusses what is sensitive personal information in reports, consumer and 
business education, and in case complaints.236 However, the FTC’s 
descriptions are inductive and common-law like, looking back to past specific 
cases to provide guidance for future decision-making.237 For example, in any 
specific case the FTC may need to determine whether certain information is 
sensitive or not. Such categorization arguably imposes legibility on the facts of 
that case. The effects of assembling a definition over dozens or hundreds of 
cases is more like the microscope—a process of discovering legibility rather 
than imposing it.238 
Such standards are often less legible to companies than rules. Indeed, 
companies often complain that the FTC’s privacy and data security 
requirements are not clear, for example. This is one of the downsides of 
standards, and indeed, a direct consequence of avoiding simplistic categories. 
Case-by-case enforcement reflects more prudence and humility than 
“comprehensive” privacy legislation. 
Case-by-case enforcement avoids high modernism better than rule-based 
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approaches.239 It better embraces Scott’s two suggestions. It is incremental, in 
that the standards evolve slowly as new cases are considered.240 And while 
each case forms precedent for future cases, if the revised principle is not a 
good fit in future cases, it can be modified or reversed without too much 
disruption. 
Compare that with what is often called “comprehensive” privacy 
legislation.241 As the descriptor indicates, such plans are often broad in scope, 
setting detailed rules for every industry and business model.242 They are 
typically discontinuous rather than incremental – the laws come entirely into 
effect upon the effective date.243 Additionally, they are difficult to revise or 
reverse, with amendments taking on the same order of time as the original 
laws.244 
Of course, some legislation and rules are crafted more prudently than others. 
Even if case-by-case approaches are off the table, legislators or regulators can 
still seek to follow this lesson in several ways. All else being equal, many 
prefer sector-specific legislation to generally applicable legislation.245 
Legislation can also adopt general principles, such as fiduciary-like duties or 
the FTC’s own organic “unfairness and deception” statute, which will be 
fleshed out through agency enforcement.246 Similarly, delegating rulemaking 
authority to an agency can minimize the need for congress to predict future 
developments—although the agency then faces a similar challenge. 
Case-by-case enforcement reduces the planner’s ability to impose broad 
privacy rules. 
By its very nature, case-by-case enforcement is not conducive to imposing a 
plan.247 Enforcement usually deals with one or a small number of individuals 
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or firms at a time.248 It typically involves a limited set of specific actions by 
those parties.249 The injunctive remedies imposed can be detailed and lengthy 
(FTC settlements are typically for 20 years, for example), but they usually only 
apply to the defendant.250 It may be possible to implement a complex plan 
involving many parties using the tools of case-by-case enforcement: a Boston 
federal district judge managed the desegregation of Boston public schools in 
the 70s and into 80s, for example.251 But its rarity speaks to its difficulty. 
One of few areas of broad agreement in the privacy debate is that the FTC’s 
case-by-case enforcement approach limits its ability to impose across the board 
privacy rules.252 Many people argue that new privacy legislation ought to 
remedy this by delegating substantial and broad rulemaking authority to the 
FTC.253 Others oppose broad rulemaking authority, believing that the current 
case-by-case approach is preferable or arguing that Congress should establish 
federal privacy regulations.254 So, while people disagree on whether it is a 
good thing, most everyone would agree that the current general privacy 
approach in the US limits the FTC’s ability to impose plans, following this 
lesson from SLAS.255 
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Participants can challenge case-by-case enforcement of privacy standards 
more easily than a comprehensive privacy law or regulations. 
At least for some participants, case-by-case enforcement is easier to 
challenge than legislation or rulemaking, although neither method is easy. 
Enforcement actions provide each defendant with an opportunity to challenge 
the action in court and with due process protections.256 No matter the standard 
in place, the accused violator has a chance to persuade a neutral decisionmaker 
that the standard is wrong or that it does not fit the facts of his situation.257 
Quite frankly, neither the standards-based approach nor the rules-based 
approach get us very far toward Scott’s recommendation that systems find 
ways to deeply incorporate the knowledge and values of participants.258 
Neither approach is particularly inclusive. The participants who can share 
knowledge and values in a case-by-case approach are primarily the accused 
violators.259 There are many other participants in a privacy enforcement 
system, including the customers or users of the accused business. Their views 
may not be well represented in court. Even worse are rules-based approaches, 
which cannot incorporate all local context present at the adoption of the rules, 
let alone future contexts where the rules will apply.260 
Even represented participants face an uphill battle in fighting an 
enforcement action. For this reason, most defendants in FTC privacy 
enforcement actions settle with the Commission.261 Challenging a statutory or 
regulatory rule is, as a general matter, even more difficult, requiring a 
constitutional challenge or overcoming Chevron deference to an agency’s 
decisions.262 
This lesson, thus, suggests a slight preference for case-by-case approaches to 
privacy over rulemaking approaches. But this lesson has more consequential 
implications for the types of consumer-facing privacy practices that companies 
ought to employ. That analysis is outside the scope of this example. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Our world grows ever more legible to human and digital observation. This 
promises humans an ever-greater ability to shape the world to meet their needs. 
It also raises concerns about how humans might seek to shape each other. 
Scott’s work contains deep insights about the use of and limits to legibility in 
pursuit of reshaping human societies.263 As government regulators and tech 
platform leaders seek to address concerns raised by an ever more legible world, 
they should heed those insights. I have highlighted four lessons for anyone 
who would intervene in complex systems: minimize simplistic legibility; 
temper ambitious plans with prudence and humility; reduce the planner’s 
ability to impose a plan; and increase the ability of participants to resist or 
shape such plans.264 Those four lessons have broad application to today’s 
technology policy questions. But Seeing Like A State also contains additional 
riches about legibility and governance that I hope academics, policy makers, 
and business leaders will continue to mine in our ever more legible world.265 
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